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ABSTRACT
Sharing genome data in a privacy-preserving way stands as a ma-
jor bottleneck in front of the scientific progress promised by the
big data era in genomics. A community-driven protocol named
genomic data-sharing beacon protocol has been widely adopted for
sharing genomic data. The system aims to provide a secure, easy
to implement, and standardized interface for data sharing by only
allowing yes/no queries on the presence of specific alleles in the
dataset. However, beacon protocol was recently shown to be vul-
nerable against membership inference attacks. In this paper, we
show that privacy threats against genomic data sharing beacons
are not limited to membership inference. We identify and analyze
a novel vulnerability of genomic data-sharing beacons: genome
reconstruction. We show that it is possible to successfully recon-
struct a substantial part of the genome of a victim when the attacker
knows the victim has been added to the beacon in a recent update.
In particular, we show how an attacker can use the inherent correla-
tions in the genome and clustering techniques to run such an attack
in an efficient and accurate way. We also show that even if multiple
individuals are added to the beacon during the same update, it is
possible to identify the victim’s genome with high confidence using
traits that are easily accessible by the attacker (e.g., eye color or
hair type). Moreover, we show how a reconstructed genome using
a beacon that is not associated with a sensitive phenotype can be
used for membership inference attacks to beacons with sensitive
phenotypes (e.g., HIV+). The outcome of this work will guide bea-
con operators on when and how to update the content of the beacon
and help them (along with the beacon participants) make informed
decisions.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
With plummeting sequencing costs, we look forward reaching a
capacity of sequencing one billion individuals over the next 15-20
years, resulting in availability of very large genomic datasets [15,
43, 57]. Although such large datasets are promising a revolution
in medicine, it has been shown in numerous studies that it is not
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straightforward to ensure anonymity of the participants in such
datasets [14, 30, 36, 56, 63].
Human genome is the utmost personal identifier and sharing
genomic data for research while preserving the privacy of the indi-
viduals have been challenging many different fields (e.g., medicine,
bioinformatics, computer science, law, and ethics) for long, due to
possibly dire ethical, monetary, and legal consequences. To address
this challenge and create frameworks and standards to enable the
responsible, voluntary, and secure sharing of genomic data, the
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) was formed by
the community [1]. The current genomic data sharing standard of
the GA4GH is called the genomic data-sharing beacons. Beacons
are the gateways that let users (researchers) and data owners ex-
change information without -in theory- disclosing any personal
information. A user who wants to apply for access to a dataset
can learn whether individuals with specific alleles (nucleotides) of
interest are present in the beacon through an online interface. That
is, a user can submit a query, asking whether a genome exists in
the beacon with a certain nucleotide at a certain position, and the
beacon answers as "yes" or "no". If the dataset does not contain
the desired genome, genomic data is not shared and distributed
unnecessarily. In addition, researchers do not have to go through
the paperwork to obtain a dataset which will not be helpful for
their research. The GA4GH provides a shared beacon interface [2]
that as of August 2020 provides access to 80 beacons and acts as a
hub where researchers and data owners meet.
Beacons are typically associated with a particular sensitive phe-
notype (e.g., the SFARI beacon that host individuals with autism).
Therefore, presence of an individual in a particular beacon is consid-
ered as privacy-sensitive information and the main aim of the bea-
cons is to protect this information. An attacker, using the responses
of a beacon and genomic data of a victim, may try to infer the
membership of the victim in a particular beacon by running a mem-
bership inference attack. Beacon framework sets a barrier against
membership inference attacks by allowing only presence/absence
queries for variants and not tying any response to any specific
individual. In that sense, beacons are considered to have stronger
privacy measures compared to other statistical genomic databases.
Despite these barriers, several works have proven that beacons are
not bulletproof and they are vulnerable to membership inference
attacks [53, 58, 65].
However, threats against genomic data-sharing beacons are not
limited to membership inference attacks. In this paper, for the
first time, we identify and analyze the vulnerability of genomic
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
08
85
2v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
1 A
ug
 20
20
, , Kerem Ayoz, Erman Ayday, and A. Ercument Cicek
data-sharing beacons for the “genome reconstruction” attack. We
consider a scenario, in which the attacker knows the membership
of a victim to a beacon that may not be associated with a sensitive
phenotype. Then, we show how the attacker can accurately infer
the genome of the victim by using the beacon responses. Such an
attack may result in serious consequences if the attacker uses the
reconstructed genome to infer sensitive information (e.g., disease
diagnosis) about the victim or to infer the victim’s membership
to another statistical genomic database of interest (e.g., another
beacon that is associated with a sensitive phenotype). In particular,
we show how the attacker can use the inherent correlations in
the genome to run such an attack in an efficient and accurate way
compared to a baseline approach. We also show how clustering
techniques can be used to further improve the accuracy of such an
attack.
Previous works in the literature assume beacons are static and
do not change over time. However, beacons are dynamic datasets
(donors join and leave) and this results in an increased risk for
the genome reconstruction attack. Thus, for the first time, we con-
sider the beacons as dynamic databases and formulate the genome
reconstruction attack accordingly.
In a genome reconstruction attack, the attacker reconstructs all
or a subset of the genomes in the beacon. Among the reconstructed
genomes, it is not trivial to infer which one belongs to the victim.
Therefore, we also show how the attacker can identify the victim’s
genome among the set of reconstructed genomes using a set of
visible phenotypes (physical characteristics) of the victim, which is
public information. Finally, to show one of the consequences of the
identified genome reconstruction attack, we show how the attacker
can utilize the outcome of this attack to initiate a membership
inference attack against the same victim in another beacon, which
can be associatedwith a sensitive phenotype. To do this, we combine
the identified genome reconstruction attack with the membership
inference attacks against beacons from the literature.
We implement and evaluate the identified vulnerability using
real genome data obtained from OpenSNP [27] and HapMap [16]
datasets. We particularly evaluate the success of the attacker to
reconstruct a victim’s point mutations that include at least one rare
nucleotide (i.e., minor allele) since minor alleles (i) reveal sensitive
attributes of individuals (e.g., predispositions to privacy-sensitive
diseases); and (ii) provide rich information to the attacker for mem-
bership inference attacks [53, 65]. We show that precision and recall
of the reconstruction reach up to 0.9 (each) when 3 individuals are
added to the beacon and the victim is one of the newcomers. Even
when 10 new participants are added to the beacon, we show that
the attacker has a precision of 0.7 and a recall of 0.8. Furthermore,
our results show that when more than one individual is added
to the beacon, the attacker can accurately pinpoint the victim’s
reconstructed genome by matching the victim’s phenotypical char-
acteristics to the reconstructed genomes using machine learning
algorithms. We also show via experiments that the outcome of the
genome reconstruction attack can be accurately used for the mem-
bership inference attack on another beacon and it helps an attacker
infer the membership of a victim only with a few queries.
This study clearly shows that privacy risks for genomic data-
sharing beacons are much severe than perceived. This is particularly
important since the number of beacon participants, and hence the
privacy risk of individuals increase rapidly. The rest of the paper is
organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the related
work in genomic privacy. In Section 3, we provide background
information about genomics and membership inference attacks
against beacons. In Sections 4 and 5, we introduce the system and
threat models. In Section 6, we provide the details of the identified
vulnerability. In Section 7, we evaluate the identified vulnerability
using real genomic datasets. In Section 8, we discuss our main
findings and potential mitigation techniques. Finally, we conclude
the paper in Section 9.
2 RELATEDWORK
Genomic privacy has recently been explored by many studies [6,
22, 50]. In the following subsections, we will summarize existing
work on privacy in statistical genomic databases, inference attacks,
and privacy of genomic data-sharing beacons.
2.1 Privacy in Statistical Genomic Databases
and Inference Attacks on Genomic Privacy
Several works have shown that anonymization does not effectively
protect the privacy of genomic data [25, 28, 29, 39, 44, 47, 59]. It
has been shown that the identity of a participant of a genomic
study can be revealed by using a second sample (e.g., part of the
DNA information from the individual) and the results of the clinical
study [14, 31, 35, 67, 69]. Differential privacy (DP) [21] concept has
been frequently used to mitigate membership inference attacks
when releasing summary statistics from genomic databases. Fien-
berg et al. used the DP concept for sharing statistics, such as minor
allele frequencies and chi-square values [23]. Yu et al. extended this
work and presented a scalable algorithm for any arbitrary number
of point mutations (single nucleotide polymorphisms - SNPs) [68].
Johnson and Shmatikov proposed using the exponential mechanism
for the computation and release of statistics about a genomic data-
base [38]. Tramer et al. also studied the tradeoff between privacy and
utility provided by DP [61]. Compared to statistical databases, ge-
nomic data-sharing beacons have stronger privacy measures since
they only allow presence/absence (or yes/no) queries for variants.
Humbert et al. proposed an inference attack on kin genomic
privacy using the family ties between individuals, pairwise corre-
lations between the SNPs, and publicly available statistics about
DNA [32]. Then, Deznabi et al. demonstrated that stronger infer-
ence techniques can be generated by combining high-order cor-
relations and family ties [20]. Furthermore, several studies have
examined phenotype prediction from genomic data, as a means
of tracing identity [5, 13, 33, 40, 45, 46, 48, 52, 66, 70]. To miti-
gate such attribute inference attacks, besides DP-based solutions
(to release genomic data), cryptographic solutions has been also
proposed to perform some operations on genomic data in a privacy-
preserving way. Existing cryptographic solutions mainly focus on
(i) private pattern-matching and the comparison of genomic se-
quences [10, 19, 37, 49, 62] and (ii) privacy-preserving personalized
medicine [7, 8]. In this work, we identify and analyze a different
type of attribute inference attack particularly against genomic data-
sharing beacons.
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2.2 Privacy in Genomic Data Sharing Beacons
Researchers showed that presence (membership) of an individual
in a genome sharing beacon can be inferred by repeatedly querying
the beacon. Shringarpure and Bustamante introduced a likelihood-
ratio test (LRT) that can predict whether an individual is in the
beacon by querying the beacon for multiple SNPs of a victim [58].
Note that inferring the membership of an individual in a beacon
that is associated with a sensitive phenotype is equivalent to un-
covering the sensitive phenotype about the victim. Then, Raisaro
et al. showed that if the attacker first queries the SNPs with low
minor allele frequency (MAF) values, it needs fewer queries for a
successful attack [53]. Later, von Thenen et al. showed that even
if the attacker does not have victim’s low-MAF SNPs, it is still
possible to infer membership by exploiting the correlations in the
genome [65]. Furthermore, they showed that beacon responses can
also be inferred using such correlations (via a query inference, or
QI-attack). In an orthogonal work, Hagestedt et al. have hypothe-
sized that while current beacons systems are limited to genomic
data, in the near future, the community is going to need a similar
system for other biomedical data types. They proposed a beacon
system for sharing DNA methylation data (an epigenetic mecha-
nism to regulate transcriptional activity) and then showed that it
is possible to successfully launch a membership inference attack
against this system. They proposed a DP-based solution in their
proposed MBeacon system. The approach retains utility by adjust-
ing the noise level for high risk methylation regions that might leak
phenotypic information (i.e., regions which are related to disease).
Contribution of this paper. In this paper, we identify and ana-
lyze a genome reconstruction attack against genomic data-sharing
beacons by particularly exploiting the information leaked due to
beacon updates and the correlations between the point mutations.
So far, all works in the literature have focused on membership infer-
ence attacks against genomic data-sharing beacons. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work that identifies, thoroughly an-
alyzes, and shows the consequences of the genome reconstruction
attack against the beacons. Furthermore, as opposed to existing
work (that only consider a snapshot of the beacon), we show the
privacy risk in dynamic beacons, in which new donors may join or
existing donors may leave.
3 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide background information on genomics
and also on membership inference attack against beacons (that we
use in Section 6.5).
3.1 Genomics Background
Approximately 99.9% of the all individuals’ DNA are identical and
the remaining 0.1% is responsible for our differences. Single nu-
cleotide polymorphism (SNP) is the most common source of vari-
ation in the human genome. SNP is a point mutation (e.g., sub-
stitution of a single nucleotide in the genome - A,T,C, or G) and
there are around 50 million known SNPs in the human genome [?
]. The alternative nucleotides for each locus (SNP position) are
called alleles and each allele of a SNP can be either the major or the
minor allele for that SNP. The major allele is the most frequently
observed nucleotide for a SNP position and the minor allele is the
rare nucleotide (i.e., the second most common). The frequency (or
probability) of observing the minor allele at a SNP position is called
the minor allele frequency (MAF) of that SNP. Human genome has
two copies for each locus (one per chromosome) and a SNP can
be represented in terms of the number of its minor alleles (i.e., 0
for homozygous major, 1 for heterozygous, or 2 for homozygous
minor).
Recent discoveries show that particular SNPs in human popu-
lation are inherently correlated and this correlation model may
change for different populations. Linkage disequilibrium (LD) is the
non-random association of alleles at two or more loci. If two SNPs
are in LD, they are correlated and co-occur more frequently than
expected. Some SNPs are pathogenic and cause genetic diseases [?
] and hence, they may carry sensitive information regarding indi-
viduals’ health conditions. As discussed in Section 2, most existing
works in genomic privacy literature focus on the protection of the
SNPs to prevent the risk of genetic discrimination.
3.2 Membership Inference Attack Against
Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons
In [53], Raisaro et al. introduced the Optimal attack, in which the
attacker constructs a set of candidate SNPs S to be queried and
submits queries starting from the lowest MAF SNPi . Let the null
hypothesis (H0) refer to the case in which the queried genome
is not in the beacon and alternative hypothesis (H1) be the case
in which the queried genome is a member of the beacon. In [53],
the log-likelihood (L) under the null and alternate hypothesis are
shown as follows:
LH0 (R) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(1 − DiN ) + (1 − xi )log(DiN ) (1)
LH1 (R) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(1 − δDiN−1) + (1 − xi )log(δDiN−1), (2)
where R is the response set, xi is the answer of the beacon to the
query at position i (1 for “yes”, 0 for “no”), and δ represents a small
probability where the attacker’s copy of the victim’s genome does
not match the beacon’s copy for a locus (e.g., due to difference in
variant calling pipeline). n is the number of posed queries. DiN is
the probability that none of the N individuals in the beacon has
the queried allele at position i and DiN−1 represents the probability
of no individual except for the queried person having the queried
allele at position i . The computations of DiN−1 and D
i
N depend on
the queried position i and they change at each query as follows:
DiN−1 = (1 − fi )2N−2 and DiN = (1 − fi )2N , where fi represents
the MAF of the SNP at position i . The likelihood-ratio test (LRT)
statistic, Λ, is then determined as
Λ =
n∑
i=1
log
(
DiN
δDiN−1
)
+log
(
δDiN−1(1 − DiN )
DiN (1 − δDiN−1)
)
xi . (3)
In Section 6.5, we use the Optimal attack when we show how
the proposed genome reconstruction attack can be combined with
the membership inference attack.
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Figure 1: Proposed system model.
4 SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a system between the beacon
participants (e.g., donors), the beacon, and the beacon users. The
donor shares their genome with the beacon. It is possible that the
donor may share their genome with more than one beacons that
may or may not be associated with sensitive traits. Genome donor
is not active during the protocol after they share their data with
the beacon. Also, beacon never publicly shares its dataset. Some
beacons may only share metadata about their donors such as their
gender, age, or ethnicity. In general, we consider the beacon as a
dynamic dataset in which new donors may join and existing donors
may leave over time. Beacon users issue queries to the beacon.
A beacon user is a potential attacker as shown in Figure 1. As
discussed, the beacon user can only ask the presence of a genome
with a particular allele (nucleotide) at a particular position of a
given chromosome and the beacon only responds as “yes” or “no”.
In this work, we assume beacon honestly reports the result of each
query to the user (e.g., without introducing intentional noise to the
query results) and we do not consider a query limit for the users
as it is usually trivial to overcome such limits (e.g., by registering
several times with different accounts).
5 THREAT MODEL
Depending on the attacker’s objective, two attacks that can be
launched against genomic data-sharing beacons are: (i) member-
ship inference attack and (ii) genome reconstruction attack. Here,
for the first time, we identify and study the latter. We assume that
the attacker, with the knowledge about the membership of an indi-
vidual to a beacon, tries to reconstruct a victim’s genome by issuing
queries to the corresponding beacon. This is a realistic assumption,
especially for beacons that are not associated with a sensitive trait
(e.g., Kaviar [26]). For such beacons, membership of an individual
may not be privacy-sensitive information. However, using this in-
formation, the attacker may infer the genome of the victim and use
this for other attacks against the victim.
This vulnerability exists both for static and dynamic beacons. In
static beacons, knowing that the victim is a member of the beacon,
only the “no” responses would provide certain information about
the victim’s genome to the attacker. “Yes” responses may be due to
any other participant of the beacon and as the size of the beacon
increases, “yes” responses do not provide much information to the
attacker. However, in dynamic beacons, when the beacon is updated,
using the change in the responses of the beacon, the attacker can
learn more about the genomes of new participants. Thus, in this
paper, we analyze this vulnerability for dynamic beacons and we
assume that the victim is added between times t and t + δ along
with other (m − 1) newly added donors to the beacon.
We assume that, along with the fact that the victim is among the
newly joined participants to the beacon, the attacker also knows (i)
the number of other newly joined individuals that are added to the
beacon along with the victim; (ii) a snapshot of the beacon before
the victim is added (at time t ). That is, responses to all queries
before the victim joins to the beacon; (iii) a set of victim’s visible
characteristics (phenotype); and (iv) publicly available information
about genomics, such as minor allele frequencies (MAF values)
of SNPs and correlation between the SNPs in the population of
interest. Finally, we assume that the attacker is a regular beacon
user and it does not collude with the beacon.
6 GENOME RECONSTRUCTION ATTACK ON
GENOMIC DATA-SHARING BEACONS
As discussed, we define the genome reconstruction attack as infer-
ring genomic data of a genome donor (i.e., victim) given their mem-
bership information to the beacon. To show the effect of genome
reconstruction attack more clearly, we consider dynamic beacons
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and we assume the victim is among the newly joined donors to the
beacon. For clarity of the discussion, we present the identified at-
tack only considering newly joined donors. Considering the donors
that leave the beacon is symmetrical and trivial. We discuss this
case in Section 8.1.
In genome reconstruction attack, due to the nature of beacon
responses, the attacker can infer if a victim has at least one minor
allele at every SNP position. This is because the response of the
beacon only tells if there is an individual in the beacon with at
least one minor allele at a given SNP position. Thus, for each SNP
j of victim v (Svj ), the goal of the attacker is to infer Pr (Svj = 0)
and Pr (Svj , 0) (i.e., Pr (Svj = 1) or Pr (Svj = 2)). For simplicity, we
define the event Sˆvj = 1Svj =1∨Svj =2. Thus, Sˆ
v
j = 0 if S
v
j = 0, and
Sˆvj = 1, otherwise. Note that inferring this information for a victim
results in a serious privacy concern. As we will discuss and show
later, using this information, an attacker can associate the genotype
of the victim to related phenotypes (e.g., diseases) and initiate a
membership inference attack for the victim by targeting another
beacon that is associated with a sensitive phenotype (e.g., cancer
or HIV+).
We consider a scenario in which the attacker has no information
about the victim’s genome, but it knows that the victim is added
to the beacon between times t and t + δ . Let n and (n +m) repre-
sent the number of individuals in the beacon at times t and t + δ ,
respectively. We also assume that the attacker knowsm, which can
easily be obtained by monitoring the changes in beacon size (or
from the metadata of the beacon). By possessing this information,
the attacker can probabilistically infer the genome of the victim by
utilizing the changes in beacon’s responses (at times t and t + δ )
as follows: (i) if the previous response (at time t ) was “no” and the
current response (at time t + δ ) is “yes”, the probability that the
victim having a minor allele at the corresponding query position
increases depending on howmany new individuals are added to the
beacon in this time interval; (ii) if the previous response was “yes”
and the current response is also “yes”, attacker cannot infer much
about the victim’s genome, especially if the total size of the beacon
is large; and (iii) if both the previous and the current responses are
“no”, the attacker understands that the victim does not have a minor
allele at the corresponding query position.
Here, the most important (or the most sensitive) information for
the attacker can be considered as the “no” responses at time t that
turn to “yes” at time t + δ . Because, such responses let the attacker
infer the positions that the victim has at least one minor allele with
a high probability (depending on how many new individuals are
added to the beacon in this time interval). Since minor alleles of
individuals are typically the indicators for privacy-sensitive infor-
mation about them, in this work, we focus on the success of the
attacker based on its success in inferring the minor alleles of a
victim using the beacon responses that turn to “yes”. Exhaustively
generating all potential solutions of this problem would result in a
total of 2β∗m genomes, where β is the total number of responses
that turn to “yes” at time t + δ (which can be on the order of tens
of thousands), and hence it is intractable. In the following, we first
describe a baseline method that provides a tractable solution to
this problem. Next, we present a greedy approach to run such an
attack more accurately, and then we will detail a more sophisticated,
clustering-based approach for the genome reconstruction attack.
6.1 Baseline Approach for Genome
Reconstruction
Here, we describe a baseline approach, in which the attacker, using
the responses of the beacon, reconstructs the genomes (of the newly
joined donors) by assigning them to m′ bins according to MAF
values of the SNPs (m′ can be different thanm and the selection
of m′ effects the precision and recall of the attacker). Genome
reconstruction attack using the baseline algorithm for a particular
victim v at time t + δ can be described as follows. The input of
the attacker is (i) complete snapshot of the beacon with n donors
at time t (ii) the fact thatm new donors are added to the beacon
between times t and t + δ ; (iii) the fact that the victim is among the
newly added donors; and (iv) publicly available MAF values of the
SNPs.
First, the attacker identifies the set of SNPs for which the re-
sponse of the beacon was “no” at time t and it becomes “yes” at
time t + δ . Thus, the attacker constructs a set RN→Y , consisting of
these SNPs. Then, the attacker createsm′ empty bins representing
SNP sets of newcomer donors. For each SNP j in set RN→Y , the at-
tacker retrieves its MAF value,MAFj . Next, the attacker assigns the
value of SNP j for each individual i (in each bin) consistent with the
SNP’s MAF value as follows: (i) Sˆij = 0with probability (1−MAFj )2
and (ii) Sˆvj = 1 with probabilityMAF
2
j + 2MAFj (1 −MAFj ). Since
the beacon’s response for SNPs in RN→Y has flipped from “no” to
“yes”, for all SNPs in RN→Y , there should be at least one bin (among
m′ bins) with at least one mutation (i.e., homozygous minor or
heterozygous SNP). Thus, once the values of the SNPs in RN→Y
for allm′ bins are determined, the attacker checks if there is any
SNP in set RN→Y that is not assigned to any bin. If there is such a
SNP, the attacker randomly picks a bin and assigns the value of the
corresponding SNP as Sˆij = 1 for the corresponding bin. The details
of this baseline approach are also shown in Algorithm 1.
6.2 Greedy Algorithm for Genome
Reconstruction
The above-mentioned baseline algorithm assumes every SNP is inde-
pendent and the correlations among them are disregarded. However,
SNPs are inherently correlated and considering such correlations
in the genome reconstruction attack may result in significantly
more accurate results. In the greedy algorithm discussed here, the
attacker forms the bins considering the correlations between the
SNPs in setRN→Y . Using an iterative approach, the attacker assigns
each SNP (minor allele) to an individual such that the probability
of assignment is proportional to the average correlation of the new
SNP with the already assigned SNPs of the individual (i.e., bin i). If
no assignment is made this way, a random individual is selected to
make sure there is at least one person with the corresponding new
SNP.
Genome reconstruction attack using the greedy algorithm for a
particular victim v at time t + δ can be described as follows. The
input of the attacker is (i) responses of the beacon to all possible
queries at time t ; (ii) the fact thatm new donors are added to the
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Algorithm 1: Baseline Algorithm for Genome Reconstruction
Attack
Input: b : beacon;m: Number of added people to b ; Population P that
represent the composition in b
Output:m′ reconstructed genomes
1
// Step 1: Query Beacon
2 snapshot1← queryBeacon(b, t )
// Including victim, m donors join Beacon between time t
and t + δ
3 snapshot2← queryBeacon(b, t + δ )
4
// Step 2: Obtain No-Yes SNPs
5 NoYesResponses← []
6 for i ← 0 to snapshot1.lenдth do
7 if snapshot1[i] = "No" and snapshot2[i] = "Yes" then
8 NoYesResponses.append(i)
9 end
10 end
11
// Step 3: Reconstruct genomes
12 S← []
13 for i ← 0 to NoYesResponses.length do
14 s ← NoYesResponses[i]
15 assiдned ← False
16 for j ← 0 tom′ do
17 S [j][s] ← дetMajorAllele(P, s)
randnum ← Random(0, 1)
18 if randnum < getMAF(P,NoYesResponses[i]) then
19 S [j][s] ← дetMinorAllele(P, s)
20 assiдned ← T rue
21 end
22 end
23 end
24
// Step 4:If a SNP is unassigned, randomly assign it to
a reconstruction
25 if !assigned then
26 randnum ← Random(0, m′)
27 S [randnum][s] ← дetMinorAllele(P, s)
28 end
29
30 return S
beacon between times t and t +δ and the victim is among the newly
added donors; (iii) publicly available MAF values of the SNPs; and
(iv) a correlation model between the SNPs that is consistent with
the population structure of the beacon (that can be computed using
publicly available genomic datasets).
For the correlation model, we assume the attacker uses a Markov
chain model, as described in [55]. The attacker calculates the like-
lihood of the victim v having at least one minor allele at a SNP
position j as
Pk (Sˆvj ) = P(Sˆvj |Sˆvj−1, Sˆvj−2, ..., Sˆvj−k ), (4)
where k is the order of the Markov chain. In order to build a
Markov chain model for the genome, we use public sources such as
HapMap [24]. Consistent with the previous work in [55], we define
the kth -order model as follows: (i) Pk (Sˆj ) = 0 if F (Sˆj−k, j−1) = 0
and (ii) Pk (Sˆj ) = F (Sˆj−k, j )F (Sˆj−k, j−1) if F (Sˆj−k, j−1) > 0, where F (Sˆj,i ) is
the frequency of occurrence of the sequence that contains Sˆi to Sˆj .
The SNPs are ordered according to their physical positions on the
genome. In this work, we use k = 1 and we do not limit the correla-
tions only for the neighboring SNPs which is different from [55].
Instead, we create our correlation model by considering the pair-
wise correlations between all the SNPs in the beacon. Here, we use
Sokal-Michener distance to measure correlations between SNPs.
In the greedy approach, first, the attacker constructs set RN→Y .
Then, it createsm′ empty bins (m′ does not have to be equal tom)
representing the number of rare SNPs inRN→Y . We assume that the
SNPs with an MAF value below a threshold τ are categorized as rare
SNPs. Observing rare SNPs do not have correlations among each
other, assigning the rare SNPs in RN→Y to different bins as seeds
is assumed to result in an accurate initial separation of individuals.
Next, for each remaining SNP j in RN→Y , the attacker computes the
average correlation between that and all the previously assigned
SNPs in bin i using the aforementioned correlation model. This is
done for each bin i . Let Sˆij be a binary random variable for SNP
j and bin i . The attacker assigns Sˆcj = 1 for bin c which has the
highest average correlation value and Sˆij = 0,∀i ∈ [1,m′] and i , c .
Eventually, the attacker constructs m′ potential genomes (in m′
bins) belonging tom newcomer donors.
6.3 Clustering-Based Algorithm for Genome
Reconstruction
Greedy algorithm (in Section 6.2) reconstructs genomes by follow-
ing a particular order (determined based on the MAFs of the SNPs).
Different orders may provide different (and possibly more accurate)
solutions. Thus, to consider all query responses together in a collec-
tive way, we propose clustering-based approaches for the genome
reconstruction attack that cluster the identified minor alleles for
the newly joined donors to the beacon. The proposed clustering
techniques essentially use the correlations between the SNPs (that
are computed using the aforementioned correlation model) to dis-
tribute SNPs into different bins. We use two types of clustering
techniques: (i) one that creates non-overlapping bins (hard cluster-
ing) and (ii) one that may assign a SNP into multiple bins (soft or
fuzzy clustering).
For (i), we employ spectral clustering, in which a standard clus-
tering method (such as k-means clustering) is applied on certain
eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix of a graph [51]. Spectral clus-
tering is our method of choice as it has been shown to provide
favorable results in many high dimensional feature spaces like
ours [54]. And, for (ii) we employ the fuzzy c-means clustering
(FCM) algorithm [9], which is a common choice for these types of
tasks. The algorithm is similar to k-means clustering, but it also al-
lows probabilistic assignments of samples to multiple clusters. The
description of both clustering methods are similar except for the
clustering steps. Thus, in the following, we describe both methods
together.
The input of both clustering-based algorithms is the same as the
input of the greedy algorithm. First, the attacker identifies the set
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of SNP positions for which the response of the beacon was “no” at
time t and it becomes “yes” at time t + δ and constructs set RN→Y .
Then, the attacker builds a graph of SNPs using the correlation
model, in which the vertices are the SNPs in RN→Y and undirected
edges are weighted by the correlation values between these SNPs.
This graph represents a pairwise similarity model for the SNPs and
is used for a quantitative assessment of the correlation of each SNP
pair in RN→Y .
Next, the attacker applies either the spectral or fuzzy clustering
algorithms on the constructed graph. The outcome of spectral clus-
tering is a set of disjoint clusters. Fuzzy clustering results in groups
of SNPs that maximizes the similarity in a group while allowing a
SNP to be shared by multiple individuals. Thus, in fuzzy clustering,
each SNP i is assigned to clusters for which the algorithm returns
a relatively high probability of association. After clustering, the
attacker obtainsm′ different clusters which corresponds tom′ re-
constructed genomes. The details of this algorithm are also shown
in Algorithm 2.
6.4 Identifying the Victim Using
Genotype-Phenotype Associations
In previous sections, for genome reconstruction, we assumed that
the attacker can correctly identify the victim’s genome among
several reconstructed bins. Assuming the attacker has information
about some phenotypic characteristics of the victim and relying
upon the fact that SNPs are intrinsically linked to phenotypic traits
(such as eye color, hair color, etc.), we also study and show how
accurately the attacker can identify the victim’s genome among
other candidates. This provides a complete methodology for the
genome reconstruction attack against beacons in real-life.
Assume victim v is among them new additions to the beacon
(it is trivial to extend the methodology if there are more than one
victims). The attacker is assumed to have access to two distinct sets:
(i) a set S = { ®S1, ®S2, . . . , ®Sm′} ofm′ reconstructed genotypes as a
result of the genome reconstruction attack, where ®Si = (Sˆi1, . . . , Sˆik )
is a vector containing the SNP values of genotype i (or bin i); and (ii)
a set Pv = (pv1 , . . . ,pvt ) containing the values of t phenotypic traits
of victim v . Such phenotype information can be obtained from pub-
licly available resources or using the physical traits of the victim.
For instance, the attacker can obtain such information from victim’s
social media accounts. The goal of the attacker is to correctly match
the victim’s phenotype to the correct reconstructed genome (that is
the most similar to the victim’s) among all candidate reconstructed
genome sequences. In the test phase, the attacker has m newly
added donors andm′ reconstructed genomes. Attacker’s task is to
match each donor with the best matching reconstructed genome.
Thus, for each newly added donor, the attacker calculates the likeli-
hood scores of matching with allm′ reconstructed genomes. In [34],
Humbert et al. focused on the deanoymization risk and modelled
genotype-phenotype association as an assignment problem. They
showed this risk by using the Hungarian algorithm [41]. Different
from [34], here, we rely on machine learning for maximizing the
matching likelihood and genotype-phenotype associations. We ob-
serve that such a formulation provides more accurate results. Also,
rather than using SNP values (0, 1 or 2), due to the nature of the
Algorithm 2: Clustering-Based Algorithm for Genome Recon-
struction Attack
Input: b : beacon;m: Number of added people to b ; Population P that
represent the composition in b
Output:m′ reconstructed genomes
1
// Step 1: Query Beacon
2 snapshot1← queryBeacon(b, t )
// Including victim, m donors join Beacon between time t
and t + δ
3 snapshot2← queryBeacon(b, t + δ )
4
// Step 2: Obtain No-Yes SNPs
5 NoYesResponses← []
6 for i ← 0 to snapshot1.lenдth do
7 if snapshot1[i] == "No" and snapshot2[i] == "Yes" then
8 NoYesResponses.append(i)
9 end
10 end
11
// Step 3: Cluster No-Yes SNPs
12 G ← Graph()
13 for i ← 0 to NoYesResponses .lenдth − 1 do
14 for j ← i + 1 to NoYesResponses.length do
15 c ←
corr (P, NoYesResponses[i], NoYesResponses[j])
16 G .addEdge(NoYesResponses[i],NoYesResponses[j],c )
17 end
18 end
19 clusters ← дraphCluster inд(G, m′)
20
// Step 4: Reconstruct genomes
21 S← []
22 for i ← 0 tom′ do
23 S [i] ← дetRef erenceGenome(P )
24 foreach s in clusters[i] do
25 S [i][s] ← дetMinorAllele(P, s)
26 end
27 end
28
29 return S
proposed attack, we represent the state of each SNP j of individual
i as Sˆij , which can be either 0 or 1, as discussed before.
For phenotype inference, we train a separate model for each
of the considered phenotypes, where SNPs with flipped responses
(from “no” to “yes”) are used as features. Since phenotype datasets
are highly imbalanced, we apply Synthetic Minority Oversampling
Technique (SMOTE) [11] for each of these datasets to resolve this
problem. Then, we train an RF model for each phenotype. We use
repeated stratified 5-fold cross validation to tune the hyperparame-
ters. After training the phenotype models, we form the ensemble
classifier using the ones that have better validation F1-macro score
than random guess. We discard the other models.
Ensemble classifier calculates the matching likelihood of given
genome and set of phenotypic traits. Softmax output of each pheno-
type model corresponding to a given phenotypic trait of the victim
(i.e., probability that a reconstructed genome having blue eye) are
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summed to calculate the matching likelihood. For single victim,
this calculation is done for each reconstructed genome and the
victim is matched with the reconstructed genome with the high-
est matching likelihood score. Note that this matching does not
need to be one-to-one; a single reconstructed genome might match
with different set of phenotypic traits. We discuss the performance
of identification of victim’s reconstructed genome under different
settings in Section 7.3.
6.5 Using Genome Reconstruction in
Membership Inference Attack
To show one consequence of the proposed genome reconstruction
attack, we also model and analyze how the proposed attack can be
utilized for membership inference attack (introduced in Section 3.2).
We consider a scenario in which the attacker knows the member-
ship of an individual to a beacon with which no sensitive associated
phenotype (e.g., phenotype neutral). The attacker first utilizes the
responses of this beacon to infer specific parts of a victim’s genome
(i.e., SNPs). Then, it uses these inferred SNPs to infer the member-
ship of the victim to a beacon with a sensitive phenotype. This
attack is important and realistic, because knowing the membership
of an individual to a phenotype neutral beacon (e.g., Kaviar Beacon)
may not seem to pose a privacy issue. However, using the proposed
genome reconstruction attack and the membership information
of the victim to the beacon with non-sensitive phenotype, the at-
tacker can first infer the SNPs of the victim and then, infer the
membership of the victim to another beacon which is associated a
sensitive phenotype (e.g., SFARI beacon which is associated with
autism phenotype).
To show this, first, we run the proposed genome reconstruc-
tion attack that is explained in Section 6.3 and infer the SNPs of
the victim with at least one minor allele on a beacon B1. Using
these inferred SNPs, we then run the membership inference attack
to infer the membership of the victim in another beacon B2. For
membership inference attack, we use the Optimal attack in [53]
(described in Section 3.2), which is shown to be an effective attack
for membership inference (for our scenario, Optimal attack in [53]
and the QI-attack in [65] perform similarly, so we choose to use
the Optimal attack due to its simplicity). However, in contrast to
the original Optimal attack, in the null and alternate hypothesis
equations in (1) and (2), there is an additional error due to the in-
ference error of the genome reconstruction attack. This is because
the attacker queries the alleles of the victim that it infers as a result
of the genome reconstruction attack and there is a degree of un-
certainty. Thus, we first experimentally compute the error rate of
the genome reconstruction attack for a particular scenario (e.g., for
particularm and n values). We then include this additional error
on the δ parameter in (2), which represents the probability that the
attacker’s copy of the victim’s genome does not match the beacon’s
copy for a SNP. Furthermore, as opposed to original Optimal attack,
here the attacker may not have access to the SNPs of the victim
with the lowest MAF values; instead the attacker only knows the
SNPs that are inferred as a result of the genome reconstruction
attack.
We evaluate the success of this attack in terms of the power of
the attacker in Section 7.4. Similar to Raisaro et al. and von Thenen
et al., we plot the power curve of the membership inference attack
at 5% false positive rate. We empirically build the null hypothesis
(H0 in Section 3.2). For every query, we determine the distribution
of Λ under the null hypothesis using 20 individuals that are not
in B2. In this work, in order to model the uncertainty of correctly
matching the victim (using phenotype inference as in Section 6.4),
we first experimentally compute the error rate of the overall process.
For instance, if the accuracy of correctly matching the phenotype
of the victim to their reconstructed genome is p%, then p% of the 20
individuals are selected from correctly identified reconstructions
and remaining individuals are selected from other new people added
to the beacon along with the victim (incorrect identifications).
WhenΛ is less than a threshold tα , the null hypothesis is rejected
and we find tα from the null hypothesis with α = 0.05 (correspond-
ing to 5% false positive rate). Then, we computed the power as
proportion of the individuals in the alternate hypothesis (including
20 different individuals in B2) having a Λ value that is less than
tα . As before, p% of the 20 individuals are selected from correctly
identified reconstructions and remaining people are selected from
other new people added to the beacon along with the victim.
7 EVALUATION
To evaluate the identified vulnerabilities, we evaluated our methods
using real-life genomic datasets. Here, we first describe the datasets
we used and then present the evaluation results.
7.1 Datasets and Evaluation Metrics
We used two different genome datasets for evaluation: (i) genome
dataset of CEU population from the HapMap dataset [24] and (ii)
OpenSNP genome dataset [3]. Using the HapMap dataset, we cre-
ated the beacons and victims from CEU population which contains
164 donors and around 4 million SNPs for each donor. We created
the correlation model (i.e., SNP-SNP relation network or similarity
model) for this beacon using individuals from the same HapMap
dataset that are not in the constructed beacon and set of victims.
Using the OpenSNP dataset, we created the beacons and victims
from a random population which contains 2980 donors and around
2 million SNPs for each donor. We created the correlation model
using the rest of the OpenSNP dataset.
For the OpenSNP dataset, we also collected the reported phe-
notypes of individuals. Since sample sizes are small, we used the
reported phenotypes in a binary form. From OpenSNP, we used
the following commonly reported phenotypes: (i) eye color, 967
samples, (ii) hair type, 371 samples, (iii) hair color, 468 samples,
(iv) tan ability, 287 samples, (v) asthma, 226 samples, (vi) lactose
intolerance, 347 samples, (vii) earwax, 244 samples, (viii) tongue
rolling, 434 samples, (ix) intolerance to soy, 136 samples, (x) freck-
ling, 277 samples, (xi) ring finger being longer than index finger, 268
samples, (xii) widow peak, 176 samples, (xiii) ADHD, 154 samples,
(xiv) acrophobia, 155 samples, (xv) finger hair, 155 samples, (xvi)
myopia, 152 samples, (xvii) irritable bowel syndrome, 142 samples,
(xviii) index finger being longer than big thumb, 131 samples, (xix)
photoptarmis, 133 samples, (xx) migraine, 129 samples, and (xxi) Rh
protein, 311 samples. We used 1320 genomes which are associated
with at least one of the above-mentioned phenotypes while training
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the models. Newly added donors are chosen from the individuals
who have reported at least 10 out of 21 considered phenotypes.
We evaluated the precision and recall for the reconstruction of
a victim’s SNPs based on the changes in beacon responses. For
precision and recall, we defined the success as correctly inferring
the SNPs of the victim with at least one minor allele. Thus, for the
calculation of precision and recall, we defined (i) true positive as
correctly inferring a SNP j of victim v with Sˆvj = 1 (with at least
one minor allele); (ii) false positive as incorrectly assigning Sˆvj = 1
for v who is homozygous major at that locus; (iii) true negative
as correctly inferring a SNP j of victim v with Sˆvj = 0 (with no
minor allele, homozygous major); and (iv) false negative as incor-
rectly assigning Sˆvj = 0 for v who has at least one minor allele
at that locus (i.e., heterozygous or homozygous minor). Further-
more, we quantified the success of identifying the victim’s genome
among the reconstructed genomes in terms of the accuracy of the
developed genotype-phenotype inference mechanism. Finally, we
used a power analysis for the membership inference to show how
the outcome of the genome reconstruction attack can be used for
membership inference attack.
7.2 Evaluation of Genome Reconstruction
First, using both OpenSNP and HapMap beacons and only focusing
on genome reconstruction, we evaluated and compared the baseline
method (in Section 6.1) and the proposed clustering-based approach
(in Section 6.3) when the size of the beacon (n) is 50 and m =
m′. Here, we assume that the attacker can identify the victim’s
reconstructed genome among the other candidates. Later, we will
also show that attacker can indeed identify this genome with high
accuracy using public (i.e., not sensitive) phenotype information
about the victim.
Overall, results we obtained from both beacons are similar to
each other, showing that the identified vulnerability is not dataset
specific. Figures 2 and 3 show the precision and recall of the re-
construction for various number of newly added donors (m) for
OpenSNP and HapMap beacons, respectively. The results show that
on average, the identified attack using spectral clustering can recon-
struct the victim’s genome with a precision close to 0.9 when the
size of the beacon is increased by adding 3 people in an update. We
also obtained more than 0.7 precision and 0.8 recall even when the
size of the beacon is increased by adding 10 people. This indicates
a substantial privacy risk, especially if the reconstructed SNPs are
tied to sensitive phenotypes. Also, the baseline algorithm performs
substantially worse than the proposed clustering-based approach.
The results also show that spectral clustering-based genome recon-
struction is slightly better than the fuzzy clustering-based approach.
We observed that allowing a SNP (that includes at least one minor
allele) to be inmultiple bins results in high false positives. Therefore,
in the remaining of this section, we use spectral clustering-based
genome reconstruction for the evaluations.
In Figures 4 and 5, we show the effect of varying number of
bins (m′) in the genome reconstruction attack when the number of
newly added donorsm = 5 and beacon sizen = 50 for OpenSNP and
HapMap beacons, respectively. We observed that for both beacons,
precision increases and recall decreases with increasingm′. Also,
as expected, precision and recall becomes balanced whenm′ =m.
Next, in Figures 6 and 7, we show the effect of the beacon size (n)
at time t when 5 new donors are added between times t and t + δ
for OpenSNP and HapMap beacons, respectively. Here, we assume
that the number of bins (m′) is equal to the number of newly added
donors (m). We observed that as the size of the beacon increases,
both the precision and recall of the reconstruction attack slightly
increases (for a fixed number of newly added donors). This shows
that the success of the identified attack mainly relies on the fraction
of the newly added donors to the beacon, and it is independent of
the size of the beacon at time t . Note that even the success of the
genome reconstruction is high, the number of flipped responses
(from “no” to “yes”) decreases when beacon size is increased. This
might result in lower performance in phenotype inference and
membership inference parts of the attack.
7.3 Identifying the Victim’s Genome Using
Phenotype Inference
Here, we evaluate the success of the attacker in identifying the re-
constructed genome of the victim among all reconstructed genomes
using the algorithm in Section 6.4. Since HapMap dataset does not
include phenotype information about the genome donors, we only
use the OpenSNP beacon for this evaluation.
We employed and compared several machine learning mod-
els for genotype-phenotype associations, including: Logistic Re-
gression [18], SVM [17], Multi-layer Perceptron [64], Random For-
est [60], and XGBoost [12]. Among these, we obtained the highest
classifier accuracy with the Random Forest, and hence all reported
results are based on this model.
In Figure 8, we show the ensemble classifier accuracy for varying
number of newly added donors to the beacon (here, we assumed
m′ = m and we observed similar patterns whenm′ , m as well).
We used the original genomes of individuals in the training dataset
when building the model. For test, we used reconstructed genomes
of the victims (that may have noise due to reconstruction error).
Beacon size is 50 in these experiments (i.e., n = 50).
We observed that the proposed algorithm provides 70% accuracy
when the size of the beacon is increased by adding 2 individuals
in the update, and the accuracy slightly decreases with increasing
number of newly added donors. These results show that the attacker
can identify the reconstructed genome of the victim among allm′
reconstructed genomes with high accuracy.
7.4 Using Genome Reconstruction in
Membership Inference
In Section 7.2, we evaluated the success of the reconstruction and
in Section 7.3, we showed that the attacker is able to identify the
victim among many added donors with high accuracy. Here, we
show a severe consequence of the proposed genome reconstruction
attack, in which the outcome of the previous steps can be utilized in
a membership inference attack. For this, we randomly constructed
two non-overlapping beacons from the OpenSNP dataset: (i) B1 in-
cludes 50 individuals and (ii) B2 includes 60 individuals. We assume
that B2 is associated with a privacy-sensitive phenotype and the
goal of the attacker is to infer the membership of the victim to B2.
We also assume thatm new individuals are added to B1 at time t +δ
and the victim is among these newly joined donors. The attacker
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(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 2: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to OpenSNP beacon with varying number
of newly added donors.
(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 3: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to HapMap beacon with varying number
of newly added donors.
(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 4: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to OpenSNP beacon with varying number
of bins/clusters (m′) in the genome reconstruction attack. Number of newly added donors (m) is 5.
only knows that the victim is among thesem individuals that are
added to B1 at time t + δ along with a snapshot of B1 at time t .
First, we applied the spectral clustering-based genome recon-
struction (that provides the best performance in Section 7.2) to
reconstruct the genomes of newly joinedm donors to B1. Then, we
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(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 5: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to HapMap beacon with varying number
of bins/clusters (m′) in the genome reconstruction attack. Number of newly added donors (m) is 5.
(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 6: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to OpenSNP beacon with varying number
of beacon size (n). Number of newly added donorsm is 5 andm′ =m for all plots.
(a) Precision. (b) Recall.
Figure 7: Precision and recall for the genome reconstruction of a newly added donor to HapMap beacon with varying number
of beacon size (n). Number of newly added donorsm is 5 andm′ =m for all plots.
identified the reconstructed genome of the victim using phenotype
information about the victim (as in Section 6.4). Finally, using the
reconstructed genome of the victim, we conducted the membership
inference attack on B2 using the Optimal attack (as described in
Section 3.2).
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Figure 8: Classification accuracy of genotype inference from
phenotype for varying number of newly added donors (m) to
the beacon.
We used the identification accuracy in Section 6.4 to construct
and infer victims’ genomes for alternate and null hypotheses. For
instance, when m = 2 we have 70% identification accuracy. In
this scenario, 14 genomes are chosen from correctly reconstructed
genomes, while the remaining 6 genomes are chosen from incor-
rectly reconstructed genomes for corresponding victims.
In Figure 9, we show the power plots of this attack with varying
number of newly added donors (m) to beacon B1. As expected, with
decreasing values ofm, the power increases faster since the accuracy
of genome reconstruction increases (and hence the error rate of
the membership inference attack decreases). For instance, when
the victim is the only newly added donor to beacon B1 (m = 1), the
attacker can reconstruct their genome and then infer the victim’s
membership to beacon B2 with a very high confidence (100% power)
in just slightly more than 15 queries. We also observed that when
m is increased, the power decreases, yet still reaches to 0.8 with
approximately 80 queries when 2 individuals are added. These
results show that the attacker may confidently conduct membership
inference attacks as a result of genome reconstruction even though
it has many sources of uncertainties in its input for membership
inference.
8 DISCUSSION
Beacons have been widely accepted by the community as the best
standard for ease of set up and encouraging collaboration without
compromising security. However, the privacy pitfalls have cast
doubts on their usability because of possible membership inference
attacks. This work pinpoints a new information leak and identifies
beacon updates as a new risk, which leads to genome reconstruction
attacks. We show that an attacker can efficiently and accurately link
this new vulnerability to a membership inference attack. Our results
show that a beacon admin should never add a single donor to the
beacon. Even when two or more people are added, the attacker still
has power to launch a subsequent membership inference attack. We
also show that the reconstruction has high and balanced precision
and recall in this case. We recommend that beacon updates are done
in large batches, which decreases the utility of reconstruction and
downstream attacks.
Figure 9: Power of membership inference attack on beacon
B2 with varying number of newly added donors (m) to bea-
con B1.
In the following subsections, we discuss some alternative sce-
narios for the proposed attack, practical use case of the identified
vulnerability, and potential mitigation techniques.
8.1 Donors Leaving the Beacon
In Sections 6 and 7, we presented and evaluated the identified
vulnerability by only considering the newly joined donors to the
beacons. It is also possible that existing donorsmay leave the beacon.
However, such a scenario can be easily addressed by using the
identified attack mechanism. Considering the donors that leave
the beacon brings up two different scenarios: (i) victim is among
the newly joined donors (while there are also donors leaving the
beacon between times t and t + δ ) and (ii) victim is among the
donors that leave the beacon (while there may be other donors
leaving or joining the beacon between times t and t + δ ).
Scenario in (i) is no different than what we discussed in Section 6.
The number of “no” responses at time t that turn to “yes” at time
t + δ does not change due to the donors leaving the beacon. On
the other hand, some “yes” responses at time t may turn to “no” at
time t + δ due to the donors leaving the beacon. However, such
responses do not provide information about the minor alleles of the
victim, and hence we do not consider such responses in this work.
In scenario (ii), “yes” responses at time t that turn to “no” at time
t + δ will provide information about the minor alleles of the victim
(and other donors that leave the beacon during that time interval).
Using such responses, one will need to run the algorithms proposed
in Section 6 to reconstruct the genome of the victim. Thus, it is
trivial to consider both newly joining and leaving donors in the
proposed attack mechanism.
8.2 Risk Quantification for the Genome
Reconstruction Attack
The identified vulnerability and the proposed attack algorithm can
be used as a privacy risk quantification tool by the beacon operator.
For this, we foresee a simulation-based technique to quantify the
risk and show it to the beacon operator. This will be a customized
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technique for each donor in the beacon and the following discussion
is for one particular donor. Assume that a total ofm new donors
are gathered by the beacon between times t and t + δ . To quantify
the genome reconstruction risk, one may run the attack we intro-
duced in Section 6, pretending the donor is added to the beacon
along with the other (m − 1) newcomer donors and compute the
fraction of the SNPs that can be reconstructed. Then, using public
sources (such as HapMap), one can gather a small number (e.g.,
s) of genomes belonging to individuals from the same population
as the donor. Then, the same attack can be run for the selected s
people (i.e., adding each random individual along with the other
(m − 1) newcomer donors), their reconstruction rates can be set
as the baseline, and eventually, a privacy risk percentile can be
provided for the donor. Moreover, for all correctly inferred SNPs,
one can perform a pathogenic scan on ClinVar [42] to inform the
donor about what traits they might be linked should their genome
is put onto the beacon. Using this information and based on the
privacy risk of the donor, either the donor or the beacon operator
will decide whether or not to add the donor to the beacon at time
t + δ . This process can be repeated for all the newcomer donors.
We foresee that using such a quantification algorithm, a potential
beacon participant can provide informed consent about how (and
what portion of) their data can be used by the beacons (e.g., when
the beacon can start using their data in its responses or when the
beacon should stop using their data). Similarly, such a tool can
guide a beacon operator on the number of participants to include
in a batch to update the beacon.
8.3 Mitigation Techniques
To mitigate membership inference attacks against beacons, several
countermeasures have been proposed. Shringarpure and Busta-
mante considered: (i) increasing the beacon size, (ii) sharing only
small genomic regions, (iii) using single population beacons, (iv) not
publishing the metadata of a beacon, and (v) adding control samples
to the beacon dataset [58]. Raisaro et al. proposed assigning a query
budget for each individual’s genome as a countermeasure. How-
ever, later von Thenen et al. showed that such query budgets are
not effective considering the auxiliary information of the attacker
about the victim and correlations between the SNPs [65]. Lately, Al
Aziz et al. proposed two algorithms that are based on randomizing
the response set of the beacons with the goal of protecting beacon
members’ privacy while maintaining the efficacy of the beacon
servers [4]. However, most of such techniques directly reduce the
utility of the beacon without carefully analyzing a balance between
privacy (of beacon participants) and utility (of beacon responses).
Thus, we believe that existing countermeasures proposed for mem-
bership inference are not directly applicable to mitigate genome
reconstruction attack.
To mitigate genome reconstruction, here we suggest three simple
methods: (i) updating the beacon content whenm > 1; (ii) adding
(or removing) donors after quantifying their risks against genome
reconstruction (as discussed in Section 8.2); and (iii) adjusting di-
versity of the beacon to have beacons with mixed ethnicity genome
donors. We observed that for beacons with mixed ethnicity donors,
it is hard to construct the correlation model (unless the beacon
discloses the ethnicities of the donors as metadata), and hence
it is hard to conduct the proposed correlation-based genome re-
construction attacks. We will further work on more sophisticated
countermeasures in future work.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Thus far, the only privacy vulnerability that has been identified for
beacons was membership inference. We have identified and, via
extensive analysis, showed the impact of another serious privacy
concern for beacons: genome reconstruction. We showed the prac-
ticality of the identified privacy concern in real-life by showing
the whole attack strategy including genotype-phenotype inference.
Furthermore, we showed how genome reconstruction attack can be
used together with the membership inference to identify privacy-
sensitive phenotypes of individuals. In future work, we will develop
privacy-risk quantification tools for beacon operators (and donors)
using the identified vulnerability and also considering the risk of
membership inference. Furthermore, we will work on mitigation
techniques for the identified vulnerability while preserving the
utility of beacon content and beacon responses.
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